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Key Points
• Unresolved sovereign debt problems are hurting debtor nations, their 
citizens and their creditors, and also can pose serious systemic threats to the 
international financial system. 
• The existing contractual restructuring approach is insufficient to make 
sovereign debt sustainable. Although a more systematic legal resolution 
framework is needed, a formal multilateral approach, such as a treaty, is not 
currently politically viable. 
• An informal model-law approach should be legally, politically and 
economically feasible. This informal approach would not require multilateral 
acceptance. Because most sovereign debt contracts are governed by either 
New York or English law, it would be sufficient if one or both of those 
jurisdictions enacted a proposed Sovereign Debt Restructuring Model Law 
as their domestic law.
Introduction
Recent court decisions in the United Kingdom regarding the illegality of exit 
consents, and in the United States regarding pari passu clauses in Argentine 
sovereign debt, as well as the ongoing Greek debt crisis, have dramatically 
highlighted the risks of an inadequate legal resolution framework for restructuring 
unsustainable sovereign debt. Unresolved sovereign debt problems are hurting 
individual debtor nations and their citizens, as well as their creditors. A sovereign 
debt default can also pose a serious systemic threat to the international financial 
system. 
The Contractual Approach Is Inadequate
One of the main impediments is that the existing “contractual” approach to 
sovereign debt restructuring — the use of so-called collective action clauses 
(CACs) — is insufficient to solve the holdout problem. CACs are clauses in 
debt contracts that enable a specified supermajority, such as two-thirds or three-
quarters, of the contracting parties to amend the principal amount, interest rate, 
maturities and other critical repayment terms. The holdout problem is a type 
of collective action problem in which certain creditors, such as vulture funds 
that may have bought debt in the secondary market at a deep discount, hope 
to receive full payment by refusing to agree to a debt restructuring plan that 
proposes to change critical terms, even though the other debt holders consider 
the plan reasonable. 
For several reasons, CACs are insufficient to solve the holdout problem. Many 
sovereign debt contracts lack them, requiring unanimity to change critical 
repayment terms — and thus enabling any party to the contract to act as a 
holdout. For example, after years of trying to include CACs, relatively few 
Greek debt agreements actually contained such clauses and those that did were 
generally restricted to bond issues. Even in contracts that include CACs, the 
supermajority requirement may be so high (for example, three-quarters) that 
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vulture funds are able to purchase vote-blocking positions that 
enable them to act as holdouts. Furthermore, a CAC ordinarily 
binds only the parties to the particular contract that includes it. 
The parties to any given sovereign debt contract, therefore, could 
act as holdouts in a debt restructuring plan that requires all of a 
debtor-state’s debt issues to agree to the plan. 
CACs have been a step forward in some ways, but they 
are not a substitute for pursuing a more systematic legal 
resolution framework for helping debtor-states to restructure 
unsustainable debt. In the past, the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) unsuccessfully proposed, and currently the General 
Assembly of the United Nations has voted to pursue, a treaty or 
convention that would govern sovereign debt restructuring. The 
political economy of treaty making, however, makes that type 
of multilateral approach highly unlikely to succeed in the near 
future. 
Advantages of a Model-law Approach
A model-law approach to achieving a more systematic 
legal resolution framework should be legally, politically and 
economically feasible. As explained in the Schwarcz Article,1 a 
model law is suggested legislation for national (and sometimes 
subnational) governments to consider enacting as domestic 
law in their jurisdictions. Each government enacting a model 
law should therefore take the steps necessary to make the 
law effective in its jurisdiction. To facilitate cross-border legal 
comparability, each government enacting a model law should, 
ideally, enact the same legislative text. For that reason, model laws 
are sometimes called uniform laws. The UNCITRAL (United 
Nations Commission on International Trade Law) Model Law 
on International Commercial Arbitration exemplifies a model 
law that has been uniformly enacted in an international context; 
the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) in the United States 
exemplifies a model law that has been uniformly enacted in a 
subnational context.  
The less formal process of developing and enacting a model 
law can be politically appealing. Indeed, adoption of the 
UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial 
Arbitration, an area of law that had for many years struggled to 
realize reform, may have been successful, in part, due to its less 
formal structure as a model law. A model-law approach would 
not require general acceptance for its implementation. Nations 
and even subnational jurisdictions could individually enact 
1 An extended version of this paper, “Sovereign Debt Restructuring: A Model-
Law Approach” (hereafter called the “Schwarcz Article”), contains a more 
detailed and systematic analysis. It is forthcoming in a special conference 
issue of the Journal of Globalization and Development, edited by Martin 
Guzman, Domenico Lombardi, José Antonio Ocampo and Joseph Stiglitz. 
A pre-publication version is available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2634653.
a model law as their domestic law. This is significant because 
most sovereign debt contracts are governed by either New 
York or English law. One or both of those jurisdictions — in 
the case of New York law, a subnational jurisdiction — could 
enact legislation based on a model law. Thus, unlike the UCC, 
the initial goal for a sovereign debt restructuring model law 
would be enactment by only one or two jurisdictions. A model 
law could also be pursued in parallel as part of an overall strategy 
for developing a legal resolution framework for sovereign debt 
restructuring.
A Proposed Model Law
The Schwarcz Article proposes a Sovereign Debt Restructuring 
Model Law (see the Appendix). Among other things, the 
proposed model law addresses the holdout problem by legally 
mandating supermajority voting that (assuming the requisite 
percentages agree) can bind dissenting classes of claims. It 
also enables a debtor-state to aggregate creditor voting beyond 
individual contracts. Aggregate voting is critical for at least two 
reasons: it can prevent creditors of individual sovereign debt 
contracts from acting as holdouts vis-à-vis other sovereign debt 
contracts; and it allows a debtor-state to designate large enough 
classes of claims to prevent vulture funds (or similar holdouts), 
as a practical matter, from purchasing enough claims to block a 
restructuring plan or otherwise control the voting. 
The proposed model law also addresses the critical need for a 
financially troubled debtor-state to obtain liquidity during its 
restructuring process. Although this funding has in the past 
often been provided by the IMF, the IMF may be unable, or 
unwilling, to continue providing funding in the amounts 
needed. Absent the IMF, whose loans have de facto priority, 
no one would lend new money without obtaining a priority 
repayment claim. Unless (as in the case of Greece) virtually all of 
a debtor-state’s indebtedness is held by a relatively small number 
of governmental organizations, it would be impractical to get 
the existing creditors to contractually subordinate their claims 
to the new money. The model law, however, gives such new-
money lenders priority over existing creditors, provided existing 
creditors have notice and the opportunity to block the new 
lending if its amount is too high or its terms are inappropriate. 
(The model law does not, of course, prevent a debtor-state 
from also, or alternatively, obtaining such financing through a 
governmental or multi-governmental source, such as the IMF.) 
The model law’s most controversial provision is likely to be its 
reference to a “neutral international organization” as the law’s 
supervisory authority. It is currently unclear what organization 
might qualify as truly neutral; existing organizations such as 
the IMF, the World Bank or a court of the debtor-state may be 
considered too political or conflicted. 
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The very issue of the need for a supervisory authority can also 
raise confusion. Formal sovereign debt restructuring solutions, 
such as a treaty, are often conflated with the need for formal 
supervisory bodies. Under the proposed model law, however, 
the supervisory authority lacks authority to exercise discretion. 
All disputes are adjudicated through binding arbitration. The 
main role of the supervisory authority is administrative and 
non-discretionary: to fact-check information and to oversee the 
creditor voting process. 
The Sovereign Debt Restructuring Model Law’s retroactivity 
might also raise a controversial legal issue under domestic 
law, and US law in particular. Retroactivity is essential for 
restructuring the terms of existing sovereign debt contracts. 
Legal retroactivity is respected under international law so long 
as it is neither discriminatory nor arbitrary. The model law’s 
key operative provisions — supermajority aggregate voting, 
and the granting of priority to financiers of a debtor-state’s 
debt restructuring — should be neither. US constitutional law, 
however, would be relevant to interpreting the retroactivity of 
supermajority aggregate voting if New York State enacts the 
model law. 
The “Contracts Clause” in Article I, Section 10 of the US 
Constitution prohibits states (as opposed to the federal 
government) from enacting any legislation that impairs existing 
contractual obligations. Nonetheless, the Schwarcz Article 
concludes that New York State should be able to frame its 
enactment of the model law in such a way as to not violate the 
Contracts Clause. In general, a state has leeway to retroactively 
impair contracts if the impairment is reasonably necessary to 
further an important public purpose and also reasonable and 
appropriate to effectuate that purpose. This leeway may be even 
greater if the contractual impairment is not substantial. 
New York State, therefore, could frame its enactment of the 
Sovereign Debt Restructuring Model Law as an exercise of its 
police powers to reduce sovereign debt defaults that could lead 
to a systemic economic collapse, thereby protecting economic 
activity within its borders. The model law’s supermajority 
aggregate voting and granting of priority to financiers of a debtor-
state’s debt restructuring are appropriately tailored to reduce that 
threat. Furthermore, any contractual impairment should not 
be “substantial”; being limited to changes that are voluntarily 
agreed to by a supermajority of pari passu creditors based on 
the debtor-state’s deteriorating economic circumstances, such 
changes — and hence the contractual impairment — should 
reflect the economic reality of what those creditors expect (under 
those changed circumstances) to receive as payment. 
A final question is whether the model law would be economically 
and politically feasible. Some nations may be concerned, for 
example, that enactment of the model law would increase their 
borrowing costs by making creditor claims more subject to bail-
in. Economists and other scholars have recently argued and 
provided empirical evidence to the contrary — that uncertainty 
due to the absence of an effective sovereign debt resolution 
framework actually increases the costs of borrowing. However, 
even if the model law would increase borrowing costs, that 
increase should not exceed the cost increase resulting from 
workable CACs being included in all debt contracts, which has 
been the ideal goal of the contractual approach to sovereign debt 
restructuring.  
The model law should also be politically feasible. As mentioned, 
its less formal enactment process can be appealing to debtor-
states. The model law would not require general acceptance 
by the world’s nations for its implementation: only one or two 
jurisdictions (New York State and/or England) need enact the 
law for it to become widely effective. 
It is also informative to assess the model law’s political feasibility 
from the perspective of the politics of the IMF’s failed treaty 
approach. That approach failed for several reasons. Certain 
emerging market countries feared it would raise their cost of 
borrowing. As mentioned, however, the model law arguably 
should reduce or not affect that cost. At the time the IMF 
proposed its treaty approach, many believed that exchange offers 
could effectively amend the terms of sovereign debt agreements 
to enable supermajority voting. Experience, however, has long 
since undermined that belief. Some also opposed the IMF’s treaty 
approach because of suspicions about the IMF’s conflicting role 
as both treaty sponsor and supervisory authority thereunder. The 
model law, in contrast, is not designed by the IMF, nor is the 
IMF part of its supervisory process. Furthermore, as indicated, 
the model law limits the supervisory process to non-discretionary 
administrative actions. Debtor-states should therefore want — 
and creditors, other than rent-seeking holdouts, should want 
them — to enact the proposed model law. 
Recommendations
Interested debtor-states, as well as New York State and 
England, should consider enacting the proposed Sovereign 
Debt Restructuring Model Law. Even if that enactment doesn’t 
occur, however, this policy brief and the Schwarcz Article on 
which it is based provide a conceptual and legal analysis of how 
a model law could be structured and how a model-law approach 
could help nations to equitably restructure unsustainable debt 
burdens. To that extent, they should serve as incremental steps 
toward developing norms for a sovereign debt restructuring legal 
framework that goes beyond mere contracting.
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Appendix 
Sovereign Debt Restructuring Model Law2
Preamble
The Purpose of this Law is to provide effective mechanisms 
for restructuring unsustainable sovereign debt so as to reduce 
(a) the social costs of sovereign debt crises, (b) systemic risk to 
the financial system, (c) creditor uncertainty, and (d) the need 
for sovereign debt bailouts, which are costly and create moral 
hazard.
Chapter I: Scope, and Use of Terms
Article 1: Scope
(1)  This Law applies where, by contract or otherwise, (a) the law 
of [this jurisdiction3] governs the debtor-creditor relationship 
between a State and its creditors and (b) the application of this 
Law is invoked in accordance with Chapter II.
(2)  Where this Law applies, it shall operate retroactively and, 
without limiting the foregoing, shall override any contractual 
provisions that are inconsistent with the provisions of this Law. 
Article 2: Use of Terms
For purposes of this Law:
(1)  “creditor” means a person or entity that has a claim against 
a State;
(2)  “claim” means a payment claim against a State for monies 
borrowed or for the State’s guarantee of, or other contingent 
obligation on, monies borrowed; and the term “monies 
borrowed” shall include the following, whether or not it 
represents the borrowing of money per se: monies owing under 
bonds, debentures, notes, or similar instruments; monies owing 
for the deferred purchase price of property or services, other than 
trade accounts payable arising in the ordinary course of business; 
monies owing on capitalized lease obligations; monies owing 
on or with respect to letters of credit, bankers’ acceptances, or 
2 In writing this Model Law, the author benefited greatly from discussions with 
colleagues on the International Insolvency Institute (III) Working Group 
on Sovereign Insolvencies and the CIGI ILRP Working Group on Cross-
Border and Sovereign Insolvencies. Besides the author, the members of these 
working groups are, respectively, Donald Bernstein, Zack Clement, Allan 
Gropper, Robin Itkin, Steven T. Kargman, Kenneth N. Klee, Christopher 
Klein, Bruce Leonard, Charles W. Mooney, Christoph Paulus and Ignacio 
Tirado; and Mona Davies, Oonagh Fitzgerald, Mark Jewett, Bruce Leonard, 
John Murray, Catherine Walsh and Miranda Xafa.
3 This would refer to a jurisdiction enacting this Model Law, for example, New 
York, England, a nation, etc. Articles 3(3) and 12 further expand this Law’s 
application.  
other extensions of credit; and monies owing on money-market 
instruments or instruments used to finance trade;
(3)  “Plan” means a debt restructuring plan contemplated by 
Chapter III;
(4)  “State” means a sovereign nation;
(5)  “Supervisory Authority” means [name of neutral international 
organization].
Chapter II: Invoking the Law’s Application
Article 3: Petition for Relief, and Recognition
(1)  A State may invoke application of this Law by filing a 
voluntary petition for relief with the Supervisory Authority. 
(2)  Such petition shall certify that the State (a) seeks relief under 
this Law, and has not previously sought relief under this Law 
(or under any other law that is substantially in the form of this 
Law) during the past [ten] years, (b) needs relief under this Law 
to restructure claims that, absent such relief, would constitute 
unsustainable debt of the State, (c) agrees to restructure those 
claims in accordance with this Law, (d) agrees to all other 
terms, conditions, and provisions of this Law, and (e) has duly 
enacted any national law needed to effectuate these agreements. 
If requested by the Supervisory Authority, such petition shall 
also attach documents and legal opinions evidencing compliance 
with clause (e).
(3)  Immediately after such a petition for relief has been 
filed, and so long as such filing has not been dismissed by the 
Supervisory Authority [or this jurisdiction] for lack of good 
faith, the terms, conditions, and provisions of this Law shall 
(a) apply to the debtor-creditor relationship between the State 
and its creditors to the extent such relationship is governed by 
the law of [this jurisdiction]; (b) apply to the debtor-creditor 
relationship between the State and its creditors to the extent 
such relationship is governed by the law of another jurisdiction 
that has enacted law substantially in the form of this Law; and 
(c) be recognized in, and by, all other jurisdictions that have 
enacted law substantially in the form of this Law.
Article 4: Notification of Creditors
Within 30 days after filing its petition for relief, the State shall 
notify all of its known creditors of its intention to negotiate a 
Plan under this Law.
Chapter III: Voting on a Debt Restructuring Plan
Article 5: Submission of Plan
(1)  The State may submit a Plan to its creditors at any time, and 
may submit alternative Plans from time to time.
(2)  No other person or entity may submit a Plan.
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Article 6: Contents of Plan
A Plan shall
(1)  designate classes of claims in accordance with Article 7(3);
(2)  specify the proposed treatment of each class of claims; 
(3)  provide the same treatment for each claim of a particular 
class, unless the holder of a claim agrees to a less favorable 
treatment;
(4)  disclose any claims not included in the Plan’s classes of 
claims; 
(5)  provide adequate means for the plan’s implementation 
including, with respect to any claims, curing or waiving any 
defaults or changing the maturity dates, principal amount, 
interest rate, or other terms or cancelling or modifying any liens 
or encumbrances; and
(6)  certify that, if the Plan becomes effective and binding on the 
State and its creditors under Article 7(1), the State’s debt will 
become sustainable. 
Article 7: Voting on the Plan
(1)  A Plan shall become effective and binding on the State and 
its creditors when it has been submitted by the State and agreed 
to by each class of such creditors’ claims designated in the Plan 
under Article 6(1). Thereupon, the State shall be discharged from 
all claims included in those classes of claims, except as provided 
in the Plan.
(2)  A class of claims has agreed to a Plan if creditors holding 
at least [two-thirds] in amount and more than [one-half ] 
in number of the claims of such class [voting on such Plan4] 
[entitled to vote on such Plan] agree to the Plan.
(3)  Each class of claims shall consist of claims against the 
State that are pari passu in priority, provided that (a) pari passu 
claims need not all be included in the same class, and (b) claims 
of governmental or multi-governmental entities each shall be 
classed separately.
Chapter IV: Financing the Restructuring
Article 8: Terms of Lending
(1)  Subject to Article 8(3), the State shall have the right to borrow 
money on such terms and conditions as it deems appropriate.
(2)  The State shall notify all of its known creditors of its 
intention to borrow under Article 8(1), the terms and conditions 
of the borrowing, and the proposed use of the loan proceeds. 
Such notice shall also direct those creditors to respond to the 
4 The Plan can be more easily approved if this alternative is selected, but 
reliable notice to creditors then becomes more important.
Supervisory Authority within 30 days as to whether they approve 
or disapprove of such loan. 
(3)  Any such loan must be approved by creditors holding at least 
two-thirds in amount of the claims of creditors responding to 
the Supervisory Authority within that 30-day period. 
Article 9: Priority of Repayment
(1)  The State shall repay loans approved under Article 8 prior to 
paying any other claims. 
(2)  The claims of creditors of the State are subordinated to 
the extent needed to effectuate the priority payment under 
this Article 9. Such claims are not subordinated for any other 
purpose.
Chapter V: Adjudication of Disputes
Article 10: Arbitration
(1)  All disputes arising under this Law shall be resolved by 
binding arbitration before a panel of three arbitrators. 
(2)  The arbitration shall be governed by [generally accepted 
international arbitration rules of (name of neutral international 
arbitration body)] [the rules of the International Centre for 
Settlement of Investment Disputes/ International Centre for 
Dispute Resolution/ International Chamber of Commerce 
International Court of Arbitration].
(3)    Notwithstanding Article 10(2), if all the parties to an 
arbitration contractually agree that such arbitration shall be 
governed by other rules, it shall be so governed. Such agreement 
may be made before or after the dispute arises.
(4)   The State shall pay all costs, fees, and expenses of the 
arbitrations.
Chapter VI: Opt In
Article 11: Opting in to this Law
(1)  Any creditors of the State whose claims are not otherwise 
governed by this Law may contractually opt in to this Law’s 
terms, conditions, and provisions.  
(2)  The terms, conditions, and provisions of this Law shall 
apply to the debtor-creditor relationship between the State and 
creditors opting in under Article 11(1) as if such relationship 
were governed by the law of [this jurisdiction] under Article 3(3). 
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